Economics and the Summer Olympics: an efficiency analysis by Rathke, Alexander & Woitek, Ulrich
University of Zurich
Zurich Open Repository and Archive
Winterthurerstr. 190
CH-8057 Zurich
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2008
Economics and the Summer Olympics: an efficiency analysis
Rathke, A; Woitek, U
Rathke, A; Woitek, U (2008). Economics and the Summer Olympics: an efficiency analysis. Journal of Sports
Economics, 9(5):520-537.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Originally published at:
Journal of Sports Economics 2008, 9(5):520-537.
Rathke, A; Woitek, U (2008). Economics and the Summer Olympics: an efficiency analysis. Journal of Sports
Economics, 9(5):520-537.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.uzh.ch
Originally published at:
Journal of Sports Economics 2008, 9(5):520-537.
Economics and the Summer Olympics: an efficiency analysis
Abstract
Applying stochastic frontier analysis, we estimate distance to frontier of countries in the production of
success at the Summer Olympic Games since the 1950s. Our measures of success are medal shares and a
broader concept including Olympic diplomas. Following Bernard and Busse (2004), population and
GDP are used as inputs. While the impact of GDP is always positive, we show that the sign of the
population effect depends on wealth and population size of a country. The results show that the spread
of distance to frontier is very wide over time, across countries, gender, and sports: not only resource
endowment matters, but also utilization of resources. These differences can be seen as caused by
differences in financial support, training methods, organization, or culture. Using the method proposed
by Battese and Coelli (1995), we build on well documented results in the literature and identify the
channels through which planned economies and host countries generate Olympic success. The method
allows to shed light on aspects of recent history such as the consequences of the breakdown of the
former Soviet Union.
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Abstract 
 
Applying stochastic frontier analysis, we estimate distance to frontier of countries in the production of 
success at the Summer Olympic Games since the 1950s. Our measures of success are medal shares 
and a broader concept including Olympic diplomas. Following Bernard and Busse (2004), population 
and GDP are used as inputs. While the impact of GDP is always positive, we show that the sign of the 
population effect depends on wealth and population size of a country. The results show that the spread 
of distance to frontier is very wide over time, across countries, gender, and sports: not only resource 
endowment matters, but also utilization of resources. These differences can be seen as caused by 
differences in financial support, training methods, organization, or culture. Using the method proposed 
by Battese and Coelli (1995), we build on well documented results in the literature and identify the 
channels through which planned economies and host countries generate Olympic success. The method 
allows to shed light on aspects of recent history such as the consequences of the breakdown of the 
former Soviet Union. 
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My friends and I have not been labouring at 
restoring you the Olympic Games in view of 
making them a fitting object for a museum or a 
cinema; nor is it our wish that mercantile or 
electoral interests should seize upon them. Our 
object in renovating an institution twenty-five 
centuries old, was that you should become new 
adepts of the religion of sports, such as our great 
ancestors had conceived it. 
Pierre de Coubertin, 1927 
 
1 Introduction 
The Olympic Games have a long history. In 1892, Pierre de Coubertin organized the first 
modern Games at Athens, trying to revive the spirit of the ancient Olympic Games in Greece.1 
Since then they have become the most important sporting event in the world. At the 2004 
Games in Athens, 11,099 athletes, 5,500 team officials, and 21,500 members of the media 
attended. Athletes from 202 countries participated and around four billion people all over the 
world followed the Games on TV. The Games have also always been a stage for politics. 
Obvious examples are Berlin 1936, the Munich Massacre in 1972, and frequent politically 
motivated boycotts, especially the reciprocal boycotts of the East and the West at the Games 
in Moscow and Los Angeles. 
The Olympic Charter (p. 16) states that ”The Olympic Games are competitions between 
athletes in individual or team events and not between countries.” Despite this idealistic 
statement and the IOC’s refusal to recognize country rankings by medals, the medal table is 
updated on a real-time basis and plays a dominant role in media coverage and public interest. 
What determines success at the Games? Factors affecting performance have been analyzed 
since the seminal study of the 1952 Olympic Games in Helsinki by Jokl et al. (1956). The best 
single predictor of Olympic success turns out to be GDP or GDP per capita, because GDP is a 
measure for available resources to train athletes, build and maintain training facilities, develop 
better training methods, etc. (e.g. Novikov and Maksimenko, 1973; Johnson and Ali, 2000; 
Moosa and Smith, 2004; Bernard and Busse, 2004). In addition, population size determines 
the pool from which potential talents can be drawn. Therefore, population size is another 
important factor explaining Olympic achievement (e.g. Johnson and Ali, 2000).  
In the light of the results from the literature, it is helpful to think about generating Olympic 
success in terms of a production function, with GDP and population as proxies for actual 
inputs. Other factors from the literature can be seen as determinants of total factor 
productivity. For example, it is well known that socialist and host countries systematically 
outperform the others (e.g Bernard and Busse, 2004; Ball, 1972; Levine, 1974; Seppänen, 
1981; Grimes et al., 1974; Johnson and Ali, 2000). Hosting the Olympic Games considerably 
increases the public support for (and therefore the money and effort invested in) sports in the 
years before the Games. The importance given to sports in a society seems to matter. It 
influences the willingness of funding bodies such as the government to provide money for 
athletes and training facilities, the direction of funding, the career choices of potential 
athletes,2 and the choice of “technology”, given the resource restrictions faced by the country. 
Importance of sport in society is a concept which is hard to measure. But the production 
function approach allows us to treat it in a way similar to technical efficiency. To illustrate 
this point, consider two countries with different medal shares Y at the Games, country 1 
outperforming country 2. This difference in performance can be due to different resource 
endowments or to different training technologies, but it could also reflect the fact that there is 
less public support for sports in country 2. The consequence would be that the actual budget 
available for promoting sport is lower, and that the pool of athletes which can be sent to the 
Games is smaller. It could also be the case that a country decides to focus resources on certain 
popular disciplines instead of funding sports in general, thus making more efficient use of 
available resources. The production frontier represents the maximum medal share for a given 
resource level and a given technology. In Figure 1, this medal share is *Y , given that the 
resource endowments in the two countries are the same. Both countries are below this medal 
share: the distance to the production frontier measures the different relative importance placed 
on sports in general or on certain disciplines by the two countries. Using stochastic frontier 
analysis, it is possible to empirically distinguish between the determinants of performance 
differences at the Olympic Games, and to isolate the effect of preferences. 
Figure 1: Production of Olympic Success 
 
2 Data 
The data set covers the period from the 1952 Olympic Games in Helsinki to the 2004 Games 
in Athens. The most commonly used measure for success at the Games is the number of 
medals awarded to each country. The variable MS  (medal share) represents the number of 
medals won by a country divided by the total number of medals in a given year.3 The second 
measure of Olympic success is broader and includes not only the medal winning countries, 
but also the countries with athletes who have been awarded the Olympic diploma.4 We 
collected data for 125 disciplines which were introduced before 1976. We grouped these 
disciplines as follows: Cycling, gymnastics, rowing and canoeing, swimming, track and field, 
weightlifting and wrestling. For track and field, swimming, and gymnastics, the data allow an 
analysis of gender specific effects. The data source is Wallechinsky (2004) and the official 
web page of the 2004 Olympic Games (http://www.athens2004.com/). 
The GDP and population data are from the Groningen data base5, which provides consistent 
and comparable GDP estimates. When necessary, we also used Maddison (2004). Thus we 
were able to include 131 countries in the analysis. Dummy variables capture host, Soviet and 
other planned economies effects.6 
3 Empirical Model  
The basic idea of efficiency measurement is that firms might also produce below the frontier, 
i.e. waste resources (e.g. 1Y  and 2Y  in Figure 1). The production frontier defines the maximum 
attainable output for a given input vector (e.g. *Y  in Figure 1). Stochastic frontier analysis 
was introduced by the pioneering work of Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and Van den 
Broeck (1977). The method allows us to decompose deviations of actual observed output Y  
from the estimated frontier into random deviations and inefficiency.7 Consider the model  
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where itX  is a vector of inputs, is the efficiency measure, and  is an error term incorporating 
country-specific, time variable random shocks into the analysis. Efficiency is determined by 
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Technical efficiency itTE  is the ratio of actual output itY  to maximum attainable output 
)( itF X , which is measured with an error itv . If itTE  equals one, the firm produces on the 
frontier, i.e. it produces the maximum attainable output given the input vector itX . If itTE  is 
less than one, the firm produces below the frontier, i.e. wastes resources. Taking logs, 
equation (1) becomes 
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The random disturbances are normally distributed, i.e. ),0(~ 2vit Nv σ . For the Battese and 
Coelli (1995) specification, the distributional assumption for the one sided error itu  is 
truncated normal, ),(~ 2uitit Nu σµ+ . Additionally it is assumed itv  and itu  are independent, 
and that both errors are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables itx . Inefficiency effects 
can be modelled by making the expected value of the truncated distribution a linear 
combination of explanatory variables itz  and a parameter vector δ , ),(~
2
uitit Nu σδz+ : a 
change in variables lowering this expected value will increase expected efficiency. We 
simultaneously estimate the parameters of the stochastic frontier and technical inefficiency 
effects with maximum likelihood.8 The likelihood function is expressed in terms of the 
variance parameters 222 uv σσσ +=  and )/(/ 22222 uvuu σσσσσγ +== , i.e. 2σ  is a measure of the 
total variance of the combined error term ititit uv −=ε , and γ  indicates the relative 
importance of the two errors. Technical efficiency of country i at time t is )exp( itit uTE −= . 
The prediction of technical efficiency is based on the conditional expectation (Battese and 
Coelli, 1993, Appendix) 
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where (.)Φ  denotes the cdf of the standard normal distribution, and itε  is the residual from 
equation (1’). As pointed out in the introduction, our interpretation of efficiency in the context 
of Olympic success can be importance of sports in society in general or the decision to focus 
funding on certain disciplines. Total GDP and population are used as proxies for the available 
resources in the 131 countries under analysis. Therefore, the measure can also reflect the 
(unobservable) share of total resources that countries actually choose to invest. 
 
4 Empirical Results 
4.1 Medal Production 
We begin by estimating the performance of countries in the production of Olympic medals in 
the years 1952-2004. As functional form we use the translog production function, which is 
more flexible than the Cobb Douglas.9 The output is the log medal share MSit, GDP (GDPit) 
and population (POPit) are used as inputs. To be able to distinguish host country (HOSTit), 
planned economy effects (PLANit), and potential differences for Soviet countries (SOVit) on 
importance of sports and production technology as well as for systematic differences in the 
resources allocated to sports, we include the dummies in both the production function and the 
inefficiency component. To assess whether there are “long-run” effects of hosting the Games, 
we also include dummies for the Games before being a host and after (PREHOSTit, 
POSTHOSTit). The stochastic frontier production function to be estimated is 
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),0(~ 2vit Nv σ  and ),(~ 2uitit Nu σµ+ . The technical inefficiency effect is modelled as 
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and the estimation results are reported in Table 1.  
Table 1: Medal Shares Production Function 
 jβˆ jβσ ˆˆ t-statistic
const 3.553 1.103 3.222
GDP -1.553 0.325 -4.775
POP 0.869 0.373 2.331
0.5 x GDP2 0.027 0.079 0.344
0.5 x POP2 -0.310 0.091 -3.410
GDP x POP 0.177 0.079 2.246
HOST 0.209 0.438 0.478
SOV 0.891 0.306 2.915
PLAN -0.600 0.333 -1.804
PREHOST 0.086 0.507 0.169
POSTHOST 0.374 0.444 0.842
eGDP 0.723 0.060 12.043
ePOP -0.250 0.069 -3.648
Cross sections: 109; periods: 14; Nobs: 712; Log 
Likelihood: -923.23 
 
The results show that host effects do not play a role in the frontier. The frontier is also not the 
channel through which being a non-Soviet planned economy (see footnote 6) increases the 
medal share. A Soviet country on the frontier (i.e. with itTE = 1) can achieve a medal share 
which is 144 percent greater than for a comparable market economy: ceteris paribus, the 
percentage difference between the two countries is  
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where REST denotes the frontier with inactive Soviet dummy variable.10 
The elasticities for the translog are calculated by taking partial derivatives of the model in 
equation (4) with respect to ln(GDP) and ln(POP): 
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The standard deviations can be calculated using the delta method (e.g. Greene, 2003). Table 1 
shows the production elasticities evaluated at the sample means. The elasticity for GDP has 
the expected positive sign: an increase of GDP by 1 percent leads to an increase in the medal 
share by 0.72 percent. The estimated elasticity for population has a negative sign. 
To explain this unexpected result, we group the countries by GDP per capita. “Rich” countries 
are countries with GDP per capita above sample average, and “poor” countries are below 
average. We focus on the range of income and population given by the 25 percent and the 75 
percent quantile. For rich countries, the limits of this range are given by 11 and 13 for ln 
GDP, for ln POP, they are 8 and 10. For the poor countries the ranges are in between 10 and 
12 for ln GDP and 9 and 11 for ln POP. The boxes in Table 2 show the elasticities for the 
respective ranges. The elasticities for GDP are always positive as expected. The results for 
population, however, are different. Only very rich countries with relatively small populations 
can gain from an population increase, which is reasonable: for poor countries, a population 
increase reduces resources available for producing Olympic success. 
 
Table 2: Production Elasiticities 
  POP 
eGDP  8 9 10 11 12
   
10 0.14 0.32 0.49 0.67 0.85
11 0.17 0.34 0.52 0.70 0.88
12 0.19 0.37 0.55 0.73 0.90
13 0.22 0.40 0.58 0.75 0.93
GDP 
   
  POP 
ePOP  8 9 10 11 12
   
10 0.16 -0.15 -0.46 -0.77 -1.08
11 0.34 0.03 -0.28 -0.59 -0.90
12 0.51 0.20 -0.11 -0.42 -0.73
13 0.69 0.38 0.07 -0.24 -0.55
GDP 
   
Notes: 
The column headers are the ranges of the log of POP, and the row headers the log of GDP. The 
thin (bold) boxes show elasticities for the interquartile ranges for rich (poor) countries. “Rich” 
countries are countries with GDP per capita above sample average, and “poor” countries are 
below average. 
 
The estimation results for the inefficiency effect are presented in Table 3. A likelihood ratio 
test rejects the null hypothesis of the absence of inefficiency effects 
( 0: 5100 ===== uH σδδδ Κ ). The test statistic has a mixed 2χ  distribution with seven 
degrees of freedom and the critical value as tabulated in Table 1 in Kodde and Palm (1986) is 
15.32 (5 percent significance level). Since γ is a measure for the relative contribution of both 
errors, it is possible to conclude that deviations from the frontier are due to noise as well as 
differences with respect to the importance of sports or utilization of resources. The negative 
sign of the dummies indicates that host and non-market-economy countries produce Olympic 
success closer to the frontier, either because they value sports higher than the other countries, 
or because they make more efficient use of their resources by focusing on certain disciplines. 
This effect is strongest for the planned economies. 
 
 
Table 3: Efficiency 
 jβˆ jβσ ˆˆ t-statistic
const 1.617 0.339 4.772
HOST -2.469 1.065 -2.319
SOV -1.586 0.799 -1.985
PLAN -6.461 1.503 -4.299
PREHOST -0.944 0.913 -1.034
POSTHOST -0.971 0.733 -1.325
σ2 1.017 0.067 15.145
γ 0.761 0.145 5.230
LR: 15.79: restrictions: 7; cross sections: 109; periods: 14; 
Nobs: 712 
 
In Figure 2, box plots of the estimated efficiencies are displayed for each event in the period 
1952-2004. The downward trend in efficiency can be attributed to the change in the number 
of participants over time (1952: 69 participants; 2004: 201 participants). Comparing the U.S. 
and the USSR, an interesting result emerges: although the U.S. has been about equally 
successful if the total number of medals is considered, the performance of Soviet athletes is 
closer to the frontier. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Unified Team11 in 1992 was 
still performing better. For the team of the Russian Federation in 1996-2004, we actually 
observe an increase in efficiency. The reason for this increase could be attributed to the lower 
performance of most of the other former Soviet republics. The Baltic countries are clearly 
much less efficient than the Russian Federation, as the example of Lithuania in Figure 2 
shows. However, the effect on the efficiency of the Unified Team in 1992 is obviously 
negligible. After the end of the Soviet Union in 1991, the former republics show very 
different patterns with respect to efficiency performance: countries such as the Ukraine or the 
Russian Federation are still very efficient, while most others are closer to the outcome for the 
Baltic countries (Table 4). 
 
Table 4: Former Soviet Republics: Efficiency Ranking 1992-2004 
 1992 1996 2000 2004 
Soviet Union   7 x x x 
Russia   x 4 4 3 
Ukraine   x 6 7 8 
Kazakhstan   x 13 27 23 
Belarus   x 10 9 10 
Armenia   x 45 67  
Uzbekistan   x 53 40 37 
Azerbaijan   x 59 37 27 
Georgia   x 46 18 28 
Kyrgyzstan   x  65  
Estonia   35  31 33 
Lithuania   39 65 25 40 
Latvia   29 62 35 25 
Moldova   x 43 48  
Number of Medal Winning Countries   62 77 78 69 
Notes: 
An empty cell for a country in the above table means that the medal share is zero. Turkmenistan and 
Tajikistan are not in the data set for this exercise, because the medal share is zero for the entire observation 
period. 
 
Compared with the performance in the Games directly before and after, the U.S. medal share 
is closer to the frontier in the years 1984 and 1996 when the Games were held in the U.S. – an 
example for the host country effect. To illustrate the host effect further, the position of 
Mexico (host in 1968), Japan (host in 1964), and Greece (host in 2004) in the efficiency 
distribution is displayed in Figure 3. The effect is present for all countries, most strikingly, 
however, for Mexico. Although the performance is rather poor over the years, there is a huge 
increase in 1968 when the Olympic Games were hosted in Mexico City. Figure 3 and the 
results in Table 3 show that the host effect is only temporary. Figure 4 displays the results for 
the German speaking countries. In 1952, only a West German team participated, with a 
measure around the upper quartile. In 1956, East German athletes participated, but the IOC 
forced East and West Germany to field a joint team for these and the following two Olympic 
Games. The performance of the joint team does not differ very much from that of West 
Germany in 1952, which remains almost constant over the whole period, with the exception 
of the Olympic Games in Munich in 1972. The fact that the GDR was allowed to field its own 
team in 1968 leads to an astonishing increase in performance. After only eight years, East 
Germany climbs towards the top in the ranking and remains there until Seoul 1988.12 It does 
not seem that the reunited Germany has been able to benefit from the successful East German 
athletes: in 1992, the measure is about as high as the ”standard” German level from the years 
before, and after that it starts to fall until 2004. For Austria and Switzerland the implication is 
that the value of sports represented in the Summer Olympic Games is not very high in either 
society. The exceptionally high efficiency score for Switzerland in 1952 could be due to the 
fact that Switzerland was among the competitors to host the Games in 1952, which could have 
had an effect on the intensity of preparation.13 The sharp drop in performance in 1956 is due 
to the departure of the Swiss team after a few days. The Swiss joined the boycott of the 
Netherlands and Spain in reaction to the repression of the Hungarian uprising by the 
Soviets.14 
A forecasting exercise such as in Bernard and Busse (2004) is not possible in the stochastic 
frontier framework, because in order to predict technical efficiency, it is necessary to have 
estimates for the combined error term εit (equation 3). But the method allows for a 
counterfactual experiment to get a feeling for the size of the host effect: what would have 
happened in terms of efficiency and medal share if the Games in 2004 had not taken place in 
Athens, but in one of the other cities competing for it, namely Rome (Italy), Stockholm 
(Sweden), Buenos Aires (Argentina), or Kapstadt (South Africa)? By changing the host 
dummies in the production frontier and the efficiency term accordingly, we predict the 
efficiency ranks and number of medals conditional on one of the five countries hosting the 
Games (Table 5).  
Table 5: The Host Effect: A Counterfactual Experiment 
Efficiency Ranking 
 Host Country 2004 
 Argentina Greece Italy South Africa Sweden 
Rank 
Difference
Argentina 34 50 50 50 50 16 
Greece 12 4 13 12 12 -8 
Italy 18 18 12 19 19 6 
South Africa 39 38 38 17 38 21 
Sweden 37 36 36 37 14 22 
       
Number of Medals 
 Host Country 2004 
 Argentina Greece Italy South Africa Sweden 
Rank 
Difference
Argentina 14 6 7 7 7 8 
Greece 13 16 13 13 13 -3 
Italy 31 32 57 31 31 25 
South Africa 7 6 6 12 7 6 
Sweden 8 7 7 8 14 7 
Number of countries: 69, number of medals: 919. 
 
 The effect is obvious: for Argentina, Italy, South Africa, and Sweden, hosting the Games 
would have increased efficiency dramatically. Since efficiency is the channel through which 
the host effect affects performance, this would also have increased the number of medals by a 
factor of about 2. The effect of Greece not hosting the Games is not so strong, but goes in the 
same direction: the efficiency rank difference would have been -8 on average, and the Greek 
athletes would have won 3 medals less. The reason for this outcome could be the fact that 
there is an upwards trend in efficiency beginning in 1996. Since Greece is already comparably 
efficient in 2000 (rank 13 of 78 countries), the effect is smaller than for countries at the lower 
end of the efficiency distribution. 
 
 
4.2 The Effect of Specialization 
To shed more light on the issue to what extent distance to frontier can be attributed to a 
specialization in certain disciplines (thus making more efficient use of available resources), 
we use the data set with the first 8 ranked athletes for cycling, gymnastics, rowing and 
canoeing, swimming, track and field, weightlifting and wrestling. For track and field, 
swimming, and gymnastics, data for both genders are available. The output measure is now 
the log share of points won by each country in each sport by gender. To compare importance, 
we use a version of the Battese and Coelli (1995) model with time invariant efficiency.15 The 
stochastic frontier production function to be estimated is16 
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The subscript i now denotes a country, sport, and gender specific unit, e.g. U.S., track and 
field, male. The estimation results are displayed in Table 6. 
Evaluated at the sample means, the effects of population and GDP on the point share are 
positive.17 An increase in GDP by one percent leads to an increase in the point share by 0.09 
percent, for population it is 0.17 percent. The fully efficient HOST and SOV countries (i.e. 
iTE = 1) have the advantage of a point share which is 50 to 60 percent higher, while the other 
planned economies can only win 75 percent.18 The likelihood ratio test rejects the null of a 
symmetric error at all conventional levels.19 Figure 5 shows box plots for the estimated 
efficiency for the seven groups. With respect to swimming results, the U.S. perform better 
than the Soviet Union for both men and women, while the opposite is true for gymnastics. In 
rowing and wrestling the relative performance is rather even. Obviously, importance of sports 
is not equal across disciplines for a given country. Countries seem to specialize in different 
sports.20 
Table 6: Production Function Point Shares: Sports and Gender 
 jβˆ jβσ ˆˆ t-statistic 
const    -3.99  0.96  -4.16  
 POP    -0.05  0.23  -0.21  
 GDP    0.09  0.18  0.50  
 0.5×POP2   -0.22  0.06  -3.65  
 0.5×GDP2   -0.18  0.04  -4.29  
 GDP × POP    0.21  0.05  4.33  
 HOST    0.39  0.06  6.31  
 SOV    0.49  0.05  9.48  
 PLAN    -0.26  0.16  -1.66  
 eGDP    0.09  0.05  1.92  
 ePOP 0.17 0.05 3.17 
 σ2  0.75 0.05 13.97 
 γ    0.56  0.02  24.75  
 µ    1.29  0.09  14.10  
LR : 996.44; restrictions: 2; cross sections: 507; periods: 14; Nobs: 2746; 
Log Likelihood: -2873.5. 
 
An extreme example for this is the case of Mongolia. Although in most disciplines Mongolia 
has never been able to reach the top ranks, there is the exception of weightlifting and 
wrestling. From 1952 to 1992, athletes from this country won 31 medals and Olympic 
diplomas. Compared to the performance of the Soviet Union and the U.S. in the same period, 
this does not seem exceptionally successful (Soviet Union: 138 medals and diplomas, USA: 
103 medals and diplomas). But the efficiency distribution demonstrates the weight attached to 
this particular sport in Mongolia: given the resource endowment, the country is much more 
efficient in producing Olympic success than the U.S. and the Soviet Union, in fact, it is the 
most efficient producer. In contrast, Mexico does not seem to have specialized in any of the 
sports in the data set. 
The performance of the U.S. with respect to track and field for men is outstanding: the 
measure is twice as high as for the Soviet Union. For women, on the other hand, the Soviet 
Union performs slightly better. A similar pattern can be seen in the results displayed in Figure 
6. The West German male track and field athletes outperformed their eastern counterparts, 
while the opposite is true for women. An even clearer picture emerges for swimming: the 
West German male swimmers were superior to East German men, while the East German 
women were superior to their counterparts in the West. A possible explanation for this finding 
could be that communist countries have been more successful than market economies in 
providing women equal access to sporting activities.21 Specialization is again apparent: while 
the GDR is especially efficient in gymnastics, it is cycling for West Germany. 
5 Conclusion  
Based on a rich data set which makes it possible to distinguish effects by sports and gender, 
we estimate the distance to frontier using a measure of technical efficiency in the production 
of Olympic success. The translog specification reproduces the results from the literature: GDP 
is a good predictor of success for both output measures (medal shares and point shares). The 
effect of population, however, is positive only for relatively rich countries. This observation 
might help to explain the mixed outcome in the literature concerning population effects (e.g. 
Ball, 1972; Bernard and Busse, 2004; Levine, 1974; Johnson and Ali, 2000). 
When analyzing the determinants of success at the Olympic Games using the stochastic 
frontier approach, technical efficiency captures concepts such as importance of sports in a 
society in general, as well as the effects of specialization in certain disciplines. After 
controlling for systematic differences in the resources allocated to sports due to host and 
socialist effects, we still find that the spread of distance to frontier is very wide across 
countries, gender, and disciplines. Soviet Countries not only outperform the other participants 
in absolute terms, given the same amount of available resources - they are also closer to their 
individual frontiers, which is also the case for host countries and other planned economies. 
The official webpage of the Chinese Olympic Committee (en.olympic.cn) provides an 
overview of 4,000-10,000 years history of sports in China, with a focus on weightlifting, 
archery, wrestling and equestrianism. Given that in terms of gold medals the country reached 
third rank behind the U.S. and Russia in Sidney 2000, and second rank behind the U.S. in 
Athens 2004, it is likely that it will outperform the other countries in Beijing 2008. Our results 
show that this is not only due to resources available to create Olympic success, but also to the 
utilization of these resources. 
 
1 The games at Olympia started 776 BC with only a single event, the stadium sprint. Over 
time they grew considerably in size, until they were finally abolished in 393 AD by the 
Roman emperor Theodosius. 
2 Because of the weight attached to success at international competitions, athletes from 
communist countries received more public support and had greater incentives to excel. See 
Shughart and Tollison (1993) for a property rights based argument. 
3 We use equal weights for the medals to calculate the share (e.g. Grimes et al., 1974; Bernard 
and Busse, 2004). Different weighting schemes for the different colored medals have been 
proposed in the literature. For example, Ball (1972) uses a weighting of one point for a 
bronze, two points for a silver and three points for a gold medal. Moosa and Smith (2004) use 
the alternative weights 0.6, 0.3 and 0.1 for gold, silver and bronze. Our results are not 
sensitive with respect to the weighting scheme. 
4 Although public interest focusses mainly on the medal winning athletes, the attainment of 
the Olympic diploma can be very important for small countries which win only few medals or 
none at all. 
5 Groningen Growth and Development Centre and The Conference Board, Total Economy 
Database, January 2005, http://www.ggdc.net 
6 The SOV dummy includes Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, 
USSR, Romania, through to 1988, the ”Unified Team” in 1992 and Cuba over the whole 
period, the PLAN dummy China, North Korea, Albania, Yugoslavia (the latter two until 1988, 
Bernard and Busse, 2004). 
7 For a complete treatment of stochastic frontier analysis, see Coelli et al. (Chapters 8-10 
2005) and Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000). 
8 For the derivation of the likelihood function see Battese and Coelli (1993). To estimate the 
models in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, we use the FRONTIER 4.1 program by Tim Coelli 
(http://www.uq.edu.au/economics/cepa/software.htm). 
9 The translog production function introduced by Christensen et al. (1973) is a second order 
approximation to an arbitrary two times differentiable production function. A likelihood ratio 
test rejects the Cobb Douglas specification in favour of the translog (LR: 74.24). 
10 To reduce the bias in the estimate of the percentage change, given the estimate 7βˆ , we use 
)5.0ˆexp(ˆ 2ˆ7
7βσβ −=g (Goldberger, 1968; Halvorsen and Palmquist, 1980; Kennedy, 1981). 
11 The Unified Team consisted of 12 of the 15 former Soviet republics competing together for 
the last time in Barcelona. The Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania participated 
with separate teams. 
12 Seppänen (1981) argues that a possible explanation for East German dominance is that it 
was the only combination of a protestant and communist country. 
13 This result motivated us to include a dummy for competing hosts into the model, but it 
turned out to be insignificant - the effect is probably country specific. 
14 In addition, the Games in Melbourne were boycotted by Cambodia, Egypt, Iraq, and 
Lebanon because of the Suez crisis. 
15 The time varying version was rejected in favour of a model with symmetric error. The time 
invariant version passed this test, see below. 
16 Again, the Cobb Douglas specification was rejected in favour of the translog (LR: 57.01). 
17 Calculating the elasticities for the entire range of GDP and POP as in Table 2, we again 
find the negative impact of POP for relatively poor countries with high populations. 
18 See Section 4.1 for an explanation of how these percentage changes can be calculated from 
the estimates in Table 6. 
19 The critical value from Kodde and Palm (1986) is 8.27. 
 
20 Tcha and Pershin (2003) analyze the issue of specialization using the concept of revealed 
comparative advantage from international trade theory. 
21 This point has also been made by Seppänen (1981). 
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Figure 2: The Production of Olympic Medals, 1952-2004 (I) 
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Figure 3: The Production of Olympic Medals, 1952-2004 (II) 
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004
Year
Efficiency
AUT SWI GER GDR
Figure 4: The Production of Olympic Medals, 1952-2004 (III) 
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Figure 5: Sports and Gender Specific Performance (I) 
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Figure 6: Sports and Gender Specific Performance (II) 
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